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HIS Article reviews case law developments in the areas of wills,
nontestamentary transfers, intestate succession, estate administra-
Ltion, guardianships, and trusts. The Survey period covers deci-
sions published between October 1, 1993, and September 30, 1994.
I. WILLS
A. WILL CONTESTS
In Estate of Hamill' the court considered whether certain beneficiaries
under a will forfeited their rights to estate distributions under the no-
contest clause of the will. 2 The testatrix, who died in 1969, left her estate
to her surviving daughters and four of her grandchildren. The will disin-
* B.A., University of Texas at Arlington; M.L.A., J.D., Southern Methodist Univer-
sity. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas; Of Counsel, Bourland, Smith, Wall & Wenzel, Fort
Worth.
1. 866 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ).
2. Id at 341-46.
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herited any beneficiary who contested the will. The mother of one of the
minor grandchildren contested the will on the basis of incapacity. The
court did not appoint an ad litem to represent the minor grandchild's
interests. The court denied the will contest, and the grandchild appealed
the court's ruling after she became an adult. This same grandchild peti-
tioned the court for termination of the temporary administration in 1973.
The temporary administrator objected to the payment of one of the dece-
dent's debts and joined certain other beneficiaries as cross-defendants in
his answer to the grandchild's petition. The other beneficiaries also ob-
jected to the payment of the debt, and the temporary administrator liti-
gated the debt issue for several years before its resolution. A second
grandchild filed a will contest in 1975, but the contest was dismissed for
undisclosed reasons. The second grandchild attempted to disclaim any
interest she had in the estate in 1992, but she later attempted to rescind
the disclaimer and contended that she should receive benefits under the
will. The trial court allowed the second grandchild to rescind her dis-
claimer and later awarded the second grandchild her original gift under
the will. One of the testatrix's daughters filed an application for termina-
tion of the temporary administration and distribution of the estate in
1989, and the temporary administrator filed an accounting of the income
and expenses of the estate. Another grandchild attacked the accounting
and additionally sought a declaratory judgment that the first grandchild
and second grandchild forfeited their interests under the will through the
will contests and that all of the other beneficiaries forfeited their interests
under the will when they opposed payment of the debt. The trial court
terminated the temporary administration in late 1992, and, at the hearing
on the temporary administrator's final accounting, found that the benefi-
ciaries who objected to the payment of the debt did not contest the will
through their objections to payment of the debt. The trial court also
found that the first grandchild did not forfeit her interest through the will
contest since she was a minor and no guardian ad litem was appointed at
the time of the contest. The trial court allowed the second grandchild to
rescind her disclaimer, and then ordered distribution of the estate to each
beneficiary named in the will. The grandchild who sought the declaratory
judgment concerning forfeiture of the other beneficiaries' interests ap-
pealed. The appeals court noted that it must strictly construe the in ter-
rorem clause and avoid forfeiture if possible.3 The court held that the
first grandchild violated the no-contest provision through her appeal, as
an adult, of the trial court order dismissing the contest her mother filed
on her behalf when she was a minor.4 The court then held that the sec-
3. Id. at 342. The court, citing Gunter v. Pogue, 672 S.W.2d 840, 842 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), stated that a beneficiary could only breach the no-
contest clause if his acts fell within the clause's express terms. 866 S.W.2d at 342-43.
4. 866 S.W.2d at 343. The court indicated that it might have held that the original
contest filed by the grandchild's mother would have violated the no-contest clause, even
though no ad litem represented the grandchild's interests, since the record did not reveal
that the grandchild's mother had an interest adverse to the grandchild. Id.
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ond grandchild's purported disclaimer did not meet the requirements of
the Probate Code 5 for a valid disclaimer, and thus was ineffective.6 The
court further held that the second grandchild did not violate the no-con-
test clause when she filed the will contest that later was dismissed.7 The
court finally held that the beneficiaries who objected to the payment of
the debt did not violate the no-contest clause of the will.8
In May v. Crofts9 the court examined the issue of whether the trial
court should disqualify the attorney for the will proponents when he
drafted the testator's will and supervised its execution. 10 The attorney
drafted the testator's will shortly before the testator's death. The testator
left his estate to his sisters, to the exclusion of his wife. The attorney
offered the will for probate and applied for letters testamentary on behalf
of the executor named in the will. The court admitted the will to probate,
then the testator's wife filed suit to set aside the probate on the basis that
the testator did not have testamentary capacity when he executed the
will, that the testator did not execute the will with the requisite formali-
ties, and that the testator executed the will under the undue influence of
his sisters. The wife also filed a motion requesting the trial court to dis-
qualify the attorney from representing the will proponents since she in-
tended to call the attorney as a witness. The trial court refused to
disqualify the attorney and the wife appealed. The appeals court deter-
mined that the wife had not shown that the attorney's dual role as attor-
ney for the proponents and witness would prejudice her and refused the
wife's motion for writ of mandamus."
5. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37A (Vernon Supp. 1992) numerated the requirements
for a valid disclaimer of property at the time the grandchild attempted to make her dis-
claimer. The second grandchild did not make, file, and give notice of her purported dis-
claimer within the statutory time frame in which a disclaimant must file and give notice of
the disclaimer.
6. 866 S.W.2d at 344. The court further found that the ineffective disclaimer was not
an assignment of the second grandchild's interest under the will because she did not have
donative intent when she executed the ineffective disclaimer. Id. The court found that.an
assignment must meet the requirements of a gift, which are donative intent, delivery of the
property subject to the assignment or gift, and acceptance of the property by the donee or
assignee. Id.; see Thompson v. Larson, 793 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990, writ
denied); Grimsley v. Grimsley, 632 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no
writ).
7. 866 S.W.2d at 345. The court noted that the record provided information concern-
ing the dismissal of the contest. Id The court found that the act of filing the contest in
itself did not violate the no-contest clause, but added that the no-contest provision at issue
did not specifically provide that filing a contest would result in forfeiture of the contesting
beneficiary's interest. Id.
8. Id. at 345-46. The court held that the objection to payment of the debt is not a will
contest, but is rather "in pursuance of an obligation under the will to ascertain whether any
such debts were properly payable .... ." Id. at 345. The court further noted that the
objecting beneficiaries were cross-defendants, not the initiators of the action to terminate
the temporary administration of the estate, and that the no-contest clause at issue specifi-
cally excepted defendants from its purview. Id at 345-46.
9. 868 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, no writ).
10. Id. at 398-99.
11. Id at 399. The court considered TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.08
(1994), reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon Supp. 1995)
(STATE BAR RULES art. X, § 9) which governs when a lawyer may serve as a witness in a
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In Estate of Davis12 the court held that the defendant must specifically
plead the affirmative defense of estoppel due to the acceptance of partial
benefits under a will. 13 One of the decedent's granddaughters served as
his guardian prior to his death. The guardian sought court approval to
make gifts from the decedent's estate prior to his death as a method of
minimizing estate and inheritance taxes. The guardian applied to make a
gift of $25,000 to the decedent's grandson, who was to receive $50,000
under the will. The application specifically stated that the $25,000 gift
was in partial satisfaction of the gift under the will, the grandson signed
the application, and the guardian distributed the money to the grandson.
Following the decedent's death, the grandson contested the will, alleging
lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence. The guardian, who
was also the applicant for probate, filed a motion to dismiss the contest
on the basis that the grandson lacked standing to contest the will. At the
hearing on her motion, the applicant alleged that the grandson could not
contest the will because he had accepted benefits under the will through
the acceptance of the gift. The trial court agreed and dismissed the con-
test. On appeal the grandson asserted that the applicant did not affirma-
tively plead the defense of estoppel in her motion to dismiss the contest. 14
The granddaughter asserted that the basis of her motion to dismiss was
lack of standing rather than estoppel and that the grandson could not
complain about her failure to plead estoppel since he did not object to the
failure prior to proceeding on the motion to dismiss. The appeals court
first considered the granddaughter's argument that the grandson did not
have standing to contest the will since he had accepted benefits under the
will.15 The court held that the grandson's acceptance of benefits under
the will was a form of estoppel, which is an affirmative defense and which
the granddaughter must specifically plead.16 The court then determined
that the grandson did not waive his right to complain about her pleading
because the grandson objected in writing to the trial court prior to the
time the trial court ruled on the motion to dismiss. 17
case. 868 S.W.2d at 398-99. The court determined that the primary function of the rule is
to direct the attorney's conduct, rather than to serve as a disqualification of the attorney.
Id at 399. The court found that the wife failed to establish that the rule prevents the
attorney from continuing his representation of the estate and that the wife should not use
the rule as a method for depriving the will proponents of representation by the attorney of
their choice. Id. The dissent would have held that the rule was mandatory and that the
attorney could not represent the will proponents since his representation did not fall under
one of the five exceptions contained in the rule. Id. at 399-400 (Grant, J., dissenting).
12. 870 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1994, no writ).
13. Id. at 320, 322.
14. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure require the affirmative defense of estoppel to
be specifically pled. TEx. R. Civ. P. 94.
15. 870 S.W.2d at 321-22. The court found that the grandson met the statutory defini-
tion of a person interested in the estate, but that part of the determination of whether a
person is interested in the estate is based upon such issues as acceptance of benefits. Id. at
322.




In Stodder v. Evans18 the court considered, pleadings filed in district
court to determine if the pleadings alleged a will contest, over which the
district court had no jurisdiction. 19 The county court of Falls County ad-
mitted the decedent's will to probate in 1984. In 1991 a person who al-
leged that she was the decedent's sole heir mailed a pleading to the
county clerk, in which she alleged that the decedent had been declared
incompetent may years prior to his death and that he lacked capacity to
execute the will. The heir also contended that the executor misrepre-
sented to her that the decedent was still alive, which was why she had not
previously filed a cause of action, but the heir did not request that the
court set aside the will based on lack of testamentary capacity or fraud.20
The clerk filed the pleading in district court. The executor and other de-
fendants filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the heir
lacked standing, that the two-year statute of limitations barred the suit,
and that the suit constituted a collateral attack on the county court's judg-
ment admitting the will to probate. The district court granted the defend-
ants' summary judgment motion. The appeals court noted that the
district court had no jurisdiction over a will contest unless the county
court transferred the will contest to the district court,21 but if the alleged
causes of action did not constitute a will contest, however, the district
court would have jurisdiction over the causes of action.22 The court held
that the heir's pleading amounted to a will contest in addition to other
causes of action.23 The court reversed the summary judgment because
the district court did not have jurisdiction over the action and remanded
the case with instructions to the district court to dismiss the action for
want of jurisdiction.24
In Miller v. Woods25 the court examined the issue of whether the dis-
trict court had jurisdiction over a will contest.26 The applicant filed her
application for probate of the decedent's will in the constitutional county
18. 860 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
19. Id. at 652-53.
20. The heir's causes of action against the executor, individually and in his fiduciary
capacity, included fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion, and the heir requested
the imposition of a constructive trust over the assets of the estate. The heir also named the
decedent's estate and a charitable foundation created by the decedent as defendants.
21. Id. at 652.
22. Id. at 653.
23. Id. The court inferred a will contest from the request for constructive trust on the
estate's assets and the transfer of the assets to the heir, which could only result if the will
were set aside. Id
24. 860 S.W.2d at 653. The court also severed the causes of action that did not consti-
tute a will contest and remanded those causes of action to the trial court without instruc-
tion because they were inseparable from the will contest. Id The dissent would not have
found that the heir's causes of action constituted a will contest and would have found that
the statute of limitations barred the heir's allegations. Id. at 654 (Vance, J., dissenting).
The dissent believed that the heir's request for a constructive trust gave the district court
jurisdiction over the heir's causes of action. Id. at 654. See the discussion of Qualia v.
Qualia, 878 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied), infra notes 179-84
and accompanying text.
25. 872 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, no writ).
26. Id. at 344-46.
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court of Liberty County, Texas. Two other parties contested the applica-
tion and requested the transfer of the case to the Liberty County Court at
Law. The county judge granted the transfer. The judge of the county
court at law thereafter ordered the cause transferred to district court. Af-
ter trial, the district court entered a judgment denying probate, which the
applicant did not appeal. The applicant instead filed a petition to set
aside the district court's judgment based upon lack of jurisdiction, which
the district court denied. The applicant then applied for writ of manda-
mus ordering the district judge to vacate his judgment and transfer the
case back to the county court at law. The appeals court first noted that
the jurisdiction of a county court is generally the same as that of a pro-
bate court.27 The court then stated that if the county had a statutory
county court with probate jurisdiction, the courts with probate jurisdic-
tion have concurrent original jurisdiction with the constitutional county
court and the district court has no probate jurisdiction.28 The court held
that the Government Code29 specifically gives the Liberty County Court
at Law concurrent probate jurisdiction with the constitutional county
court.30 The court thus found that the district court has no jurisdiction
over probate matters in Liberty County.31 Because the district court had
no probate jurisdiction, the court held that the district court's order deny-
ing probate was void and conditionally granted the petition for writ of
mandamus. 32
In Neeley v. Turner33 the court determined that the trial court incor-
rectly granted summary judgment for the beneficiary under a will when
the contestant submitted some evidence that the testator was of unsound
mind and the beneficiary only asserted that no evidence existed that the
testator was of unsound mind and that he did not exert undue influence. 34
In 1990 the decedent entered a nursing home while under medication that
disoriented her. About three months after she entered the nursing home
the decedent made a new will that benefitted her nephew to the exclusion
27. Id. at 345. The court examined TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1995),
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 1995), which provides that in counties that
have no statutory probate court, county court at law, or other court with probate jurisdic-
tion, the county court may transfer contested proceedings to district court, and TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 5(c) (Vernon Supp. 1995), which provides that the county court shall transfer
contested proceedings to the probate court, county court at law, or other statutory court
that has the jurisdiction of a probate court rather than to district court if the county has
one of these courts. 872 S.W.2d at 345.
28. 872 S.W.2d at 345. See Bailey v. Cherokee County Appraisal Dist., 862 S.W.2d 581
(Tex. 1993). For a discussion of Bailey, see infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
29. TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 25.1482(a)(1) (Vernon 1988), now found at TEX. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 25.1482(a) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
30. 872 S.W.2d at 345.
31. Itt The district court had no general grant of jurisdiction, no specific jurisdiction
under TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 24.430 (Vernon Supp. 1995), which established the district
court involved in this case, and no default jurisdiction under TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8. 872
S.W.2d at 345.
32. 872 S.W.2d at 346.
33. 873 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. App.-I'Tler 1994, no writ).
34. Id. at 114.
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of other family members. The decedent died in February 1992, and the
nephew offered her will for probate a few days later. Eight days after the
nephew offered the will for probate, the decedent's brother filed a will
contest. The nephew filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that
the decedent was of sound mind when she signed her will and that no
evidence existed that he unduly influenced her. The nephew's motion
contained as an exhibit excerpted deposition testimony of the decedent's
doctor. The brother objected to the form of the evidence submitted with
the nephew's motion and alleged that the nephew had presented little
evidence of capacity and no evidence of lack of undue influence. The
brother also submitted a letter from the decedent's doctor that provided
evidence that the decedent did not have testamentary capacity when she
signed the will. The trial court granted the nephew's motion for summary
judgment. The appeals court held that the letter attached to the brother's
objection raised a fact issue concerning the decedent's capacity and that
the trial court improperly granted summary judgment. 35 The court also
held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue
of undue influence since the nephew presented no evidence that he did
not exert undue influence. 36
B. WILL CONSTRUCTION
In Thomasson v. Kirk37 the court examined the issue of whether the
testator intended to make testamentary gifts to his siblings only if they
survived him.38 At the time the testator made his will, one of his brothers
and three of his sisters were living. The testator named his living siblings
in his will. The brother and one of the sisters died after the testator made
his will, but before the testator's death. One of the testator's sisters died
during the period of administration of the decedent's estate. The will
provided that each of the siblings living at the time the testator made his
will would receive one-sixth of the estate, unless the sibling predeceased
the testator or died during the administration of his estate, in which case
the share of the deceased sibling would pass to the testator's nieces and
nephews. The probate court construed the will to mean that if any of the
siblings were not living at the time of division of the estate, the deceased
sibling's share would pass to the nieces and nephews. The representatives
of the estate of the sister who survived the testator, but died prior to
distribution of the estate, appealed. The appeals court held that the testa-
tor's language clearly expressed the testator's intent to give only those
siblings who survived him and the distribution of his estate a one-sixth
share of his estate.39
35. Id.
36. Id
37. 859 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
38. AL at 494-96.
39. Id. at 495. The court also found that, pursuant to TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 47(c)
and (f) (Vernon Supp. 1995), the testator could legally limit his testamentary gifts to sib-
lings who survived until the conditions he set in his will were met. Id
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In Barker v. Rosentha140 the court determined that the will in issue was
not ambiguous41 and that the estate created under the terms of the will
was a fee simple determinable. 42 The decedent created a testamentary
trust for the benefit of her daughter. The will provided that the trust
would terminate when the daughter attained age fifty, at which time the
daughter would receive the trust estate, with the instructions that she use
the trust estate cautiously and will the remains to the decedent's three
nephews. The trial court determined that the daughter received the trust
estate as a fee simple determinable. The nephews appealed, contending
that the will was ambiguous. The appeals court first held that the will was
not ambiguous. 43 The nephews also contended on appeal that the daugh-
ter did not receive a fee simple determinable under the will, but rather
she received a life estate with the nephews receiving a vested remainder.
The court examined Brack v. Brodbeck" and Singer v. Singer45 and con-
cluded that the will created a fee simple determinable 46 as a matter of
law.47 The court held that the decedent intended for her daughter to
have full power over the property during her life, but that if any of the
property remained at her death, the testator directed the disposition of
the remaining property to her nephews rather than to her daughter's
heirs.48
40. 875 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
41. Id at 781.
42. Id at 780, 782.
43. Id. at 781. The nephews contended that the will was ambiguous as a matter of law.
One of the assertions the nephews made was that the will did not include granting lan-
guage in the paragraph that provided for termination of the trust when the daughter at-
tained age 50. The court found that the termination paragraph was not a grant, but merely
stated the decedent's wishes about how her daughter would use the property. Id The
court also found no ambiguity based upon the decedent's alleged intent to maintain the
trust estate for the benefit of her blood relatives, since the will contained no evidence of
this intent. Id. Finally, the court found that the nephews' allegations of ambiguity based
upon what was not stated in the will, rather than the actual language of the will, did not
create an ambiguity. Id.
44. 466 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1971, no writ). In Brack the
court found that the beneficiary received a fee simple determinable since she had the right
to use the property during her life, but if any of the property remained on hand at her
death, it would pass to persons designated by the testator. Id. at 603.
45. 150 Tex. 115,237 S.W.2d 600,605 (1951). The court in Singer found that the provi-
sion for distribution of property following the deaths of the beneficiaries created a fee
simple determinable since the will directed the distribution of any of the estate remaining
on hand at the deaths of the beneficiaries. Id. at 605.
46. The court cited 34 TEX. JUR. 3d Estates § 8 (1984) to define a fee simple determi-
nable as follows:
... a fee that may never terminate or that may be terminated in accordance
with the instrument that created the estate. Although an estate in fee simple
is granted, the estate may be limited by a subsequent valid provision that the
estate shall go over to others on the happening of a certain contingency. The
estate, when so limited, is still a fee, for the reason that it will last forever if
the contingency does not happen ....
875 S.W.2d 781-82.





In Trim v. Daniels49 the court held that the decedent's written note on
the back of a greeting card was a valid holographic will.50 The decedent,
a practicing attorney, sent his alleged common law wife a greeting card
approximately three weeks prior to his death. The decedent signed the
inside of the card with his full name, indicated his intent that the back of
the card be examined, and wrote that he left everything to the alleged
common law wife on the back of the card. The decedent placed his ini-
tials under the donative language on the back of the card, then added a
note that things should be handled pursuant to an incomplete will. The
common law wife filed the card for probate as the decedent's holographic
will. Another woman, who also alleged that she was decedent's common
law wife, contested the validity of the will and claimed that the decedent
died intestate. The contestant also alleged that her son was decedent's
son and sole heir. The trial court found that the writing on the greeting
card was a valid holographic will, which the decedent executed with testa-
mentary intent. The contestant appealed, alleging that the writing does
not name the testator and that the testator cannot be determined, that the
initials after the donative language do not identify the testator, and that
the note following the initials provide evidence that the testator did not
intend the writing to be his will. The contestant did not allege that the
handwriting was not the decedent's. The appeals court noted that the
decedent was a practicing attorney who had the knowledge to make a will
and that the clear meaning of the language on. the back of the greeting
card was that the decedent intended to give all of his property to the
named beneficiary.5' The court added that the instructional phrase fol-
lowing the decedent's initials did not incorporate the incomplete will by
reference 52 and the phrase was precatory, not mandatory.5 3 The dissent
would have held that the decedent did not have testamentary intent when
he wrote the words on the greeting card.54
D. CONTRACrUAL WILL
In Stephens v. Stephens"5 the court examined whether to impose a con-
structive trust over the decedent's estate to enforce the terms of an ear-
49. 862 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
50. Id. at 10.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 11. The court found that, as a matter of law, the decedent's property all
passed to the beneficiary named on the back of the greeting card and not according to the
unidentified incomplete will. Id.
54. Id. at 13-14 (Mirabal, J., dissenting). The dissent believed that the reference to the
incomplete will may have indicated the decedent's intent to distribute his estate in accord-
ance with the provisions of the incomplete will. Id. The dissent would have found that a
factual issue existed concerning the incomplete will and would have reversed the summaryjudgment. Id. at 14.
55. 877 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. App.-Waco 1994, no writ).
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ier contractual will.56 The decedent and his wife married in 1971, and
they executed a joint and contractual will in 1986. In the joint and con-
tractual will, the decedent and his wife each left his or her estate to the
other, with the property passing equally to the decedent's children and
the wife's children upon the death of the survivor. The decedent filed for
divorce in February 1992. Several days before filing for divorce, the dece-
dent executed a new will, in which he left his estate equally to his three
children and made no provision for his wife. The wife filed a pleading in
the divorce action, in which she also sought a divorce. The decedent died
in June 1992, prior to the divorce. The wife filed the 1986 joint and con-
tractual will for probate, and one of the decedent's sons contested the
probate of the 1986 will and filed an application to probate the 1992 will.
The county court transferred the cause to district court. Following the
transfer, the wife recognized that the court should admit the 1992 will to
probate, but requested the imposition of a constructive trust on the estate
to effect the terms of the 1986 joint and contractual will. The district
court admitted the 1992 will to probate and denied the wife's request for
a constructive trust. The district court found, among other things, that
the parties were in the process of divorcing at the time of the decedent's
death, that the wife had knowledge of the 1992 will, and that the wife had
not detrimentally relied upon the 1986 will. The district court concluded
that although the 1986 will was contractual, the consideration for the con-
tract failed, that the decedent did not defraud the wife through his execu-
tion of the 1992 will, and that the judgment reflected the wishes of both
the decedent and his wife as reflected in their divorce proceedings. The
appeals court noted that either party may revoke a contractual will.57
The court distinguished the decedent's revocation of the 1986 will in con-
templation of divorce from the situation in which one of the parties to the
contractual will had died, the other party received benefits under the will,
and the other party then revoked the contractual will.58 The court noted
that, because a constructive trust is an equitable remedy, the trial court
had discretion in deciding whether to impose the constructive trust based
upon the equity of the situation.5 9 The court held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in determining not to impose a constructive trust,
but limited its holding to the facts of the case. 6°
56. Id. at 804-06.
57. Id. at 804.
58. Id. at 805.
59. Id.
60. Id. The court considered the stipulation of the parties that the decedent and his
wife would have divorced if the decedent had lived and that, pursuant to TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 69 (Vernon 1980), the divorce would have voided the decedent's testamentary gifts




In In re Group Life Insurance Proceeds of Mallory6' the court deter-
mined that former stepchildren could receive life insurance benefits when
the insured failed to change the beneficiary designation after divorcing
the stepchildren's mother.62 Following the decedent's marriage in 1991
he changed the beneficiary designation on his group life insurance policy
to show his new wife as primary beneficiary with his children and his
wife's children to share equally as contingent beneficiaries if his wife pre-
deceased him. The decedent and his wife divorced in 1992 and the court
awarded the decedent ownership of his group life policy. The decedent
did not change his beneficiary designation following the divorce. The de-
cedent died early in 1993. The life insurance company notified the dece-
dent's ex-wife that she was not entitled to the insurance benefits pursuant
to provisions of the Texas Family Code. 63 The decedent's children filed
suit for a declaratory judgment that both the primary and contingent ben-
eficiary designations were void and that the children should receive the
life insurance benefits as the decedent's heirs. The ex-wife stipulated that
she was not entitled to benefits, and the trial court found that the dece-
dent never changed his beneficiary designation and awarded the two
stepchildren their equal shares of the insurance proceeds. The appeals
court held that the insurance company must pay the proceeds to the con-
tingent beneficiaries since the divorce revoked the primary beneficiary
designation.64
In McNeme v. Estate of Hart65 the court determined that a signature
card that indicated survivorship rights and contained the decedent's ini-
tials, but no signature, created survivorship rights when it incorporated a
deposit agreement by reference. 66 The trial court determined that two of
the decedent's bank accounts were probate assets since they did not cre-
ate survivorship rights in the other joint tenant. The decedent and the
other joint tenant signed a signature card for the account at the First Na-
tional Bank of Monahans. The signature card contained language stating
that the account had rights of survivorship. The appeals court held that
although the signature card does not contain the exact statutory language
for creation of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, the language on
the card was sufficient to create survivorship rights.67 The appeals court
61. 872 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, no writ).
62. Id. at 803.
63. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.632 (a)-(c) (Vernon Supp. 1995) provides that a former
spouse may not receive insurance benefits if the divorce occurs following the date of the
beneficiary designation unless certain exceptions apply. See TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 69(Vernon 1980), which provides that an ex-spouse may not receive benefits under the dece-
dent's will if the decedent divorces the ex-spouse after making the will.
64. 872 S.W.2d at 803. The court found that TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.632(c)(Vernon Supp. 1995) required payment to the contingent beneficiaries after the divorce.
872 S.W.2d at 803.
65. 860 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ).
66. Id. at 540-41.
67. Id at 539-40.
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held that the second account at a different Midland bank did not have
survivorship rights,68 but concluded differently on motion for rehearing. 69
The court also considered survivorship issues in Banks v. Browning7 °
and determined that two account cards clearly indicated the decedent's
intent to create survivorship rights in joint accounts.71 The decedent died
intestate. The decedent and his second wife held community funds in two
joint savings accounts. The decedent's children and grandchildren from
his first marriage sued the wife to recover the decedent's interest in the
funds in the two accounts, based upon the allegation that the signature
cards did not create survivorship rights. The trial court entered summaryjudgment for the wife, finding that the cards were written contracts for
joint accounts with rights of survivorship. The appeals court examined
both signature cards, which the decedent and his wife had signed. Some-
one had marked each card in the appropriate block to create survivorship
rights. The children and grandchildren asserted that someone placed the
markings creating the survivorship rights after the decedent signed the
cards. The appeals court held that the language on the cards unambigu-
ously created survivorship rights and that it could not consider extrinsic
evidence of the decedent's intent.72
III. INTESTATE SUCCESSION
In York v. Flowers73 the court examined the inheritance rights of a rec-
ognized illegitimate daughter.74 The daughter lived with her adoptive
mother and alleged biological father during her childhood. During their
marriage, the mother and father bought a tract of real property as com-
munity property. The father died intestate in 1944. In 1955 the mother
conveyed the real property, except for a life estate, to a third party, who
apparently was a relative of the mother, by general warranty deed. In
1992 the daughter attempted to establish that she inherited her alleged
father's one-half interest in the real property. The owner of the real
property filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the daugh-
ter could not inherit from her alleged father, that various statutes of limi-
tation concerning adverse possession barred the daughter's claim, and
that, even if no other statute of limitation barred her claim, the residual
68. Id at 539.
69. Id. at 540-41. Initially the court found that the initials indicating creation of survi-
vorship rights on the signature card did not create a'survivorship right. Id. at 539. The
signature card referenced the bank's deposit agreement, which contained a definition of
survivorship rights, but no party to the account signed the deposit agreement. The dissent
would have found that the initials on the Midland signature card created a survivorship
right. Id. at 540 (Larsen, J., concurring and dissenting). On motion for rehearing the court
considered the Midland bank's amicus brief and found that initials can show that the dece-
dent signed the agreement. Id at 540.
70. 873 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied).
71. Id. at 765.
72. Id. The court also found that marking a block with an "X" is sufficient to indicate
one's intent to establish a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. ld.
73. 872 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied).
74. Id. at 14-15.
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four-year statute of limitation barred her claim. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the property owner. The appeals court held that
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the first point
raised by the land owner because the law is contrary to the owner's argu-
ment.75 The court then held that the adverse possession statutes of limi-
tation76 did not apply between co-tenants unless one co-tenant clearly
held the property adversely to the other co-tenant and repudiated the
other co-tenant's title.77 The court finally determined that the residual
four-year statute of limitations78 did not apply because the daughter's
claim concerned her interest in real property.79
IV. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
A. MUNIMENT OF TITLE
In Chovanec v. Chovanec80 the court held that a fact issue existed con-
cerning a spouse's failure to offer his deceased wife's will for probate
within four years of her death and reversed and remanded the trial
court's summary judgment denying the will probate as a muniment of
title.8 ' The decedent died in 1979, and she left her husband all of her
property in her will. The husband did not offer the will for probate within
four years of the decedent's death as required in the Probate Code.82
During his marriage the husband received certain real property from his
parents, which the husband believed to be his separate property. Title to
the property actually was in the names of both the husband and the dece-
dent. Following the decedent's death the husband executed three oil and
gas leases covering the real property. The husband executed the first oil
and gas lease the year following the decedent's death, but the lessee did
not inquire about an estate administration, a will, or any other authority
that the husband had to enter the lease. The husband decided to sell the
property in 1992 and only learned at that time that the property was also
75. Id. The court found that the cases and arguments on which the property owner
relied no longer reflect the law in Texas. Id. at 15. The court found that the daughter
established a material issue of fact with the evidence that she presented concerning her
relationship with her alleged father and that the trial court incorrectly granted summary
judgment. Id. The court found that the daughter's uncontradicted evidence supported her
proceeding under the presumption created in TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.02(a)(5) (Vernon
Supp. 1995) to prove her intestate succession rights under TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b)
(Vernon Supp. 1995). Id.
76. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.024, .025, .026, .027, .028 (Vernon 1986
& Supp. 1995).
77. 872 S.W.2d at 15 (citing Todd v. Bruner, 365 S.W.2d 155, 156 (Tex. 1963)). The
daughter testified that none of the owners of the property had ever indicated to her that
they owned all interests in the property. She also testified that, although she knew of the
deed, she had never seen it and did not know that it purported to convey full ownership
interests in the property.
78. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 1986). This statute does
not apply to causes of action involving real property. Id.
79. 872 S.W.2d at 16.
80. 881 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
81. Id. at 137-38.
82. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 73(a) (Vernon 1980).
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held in his wife's name. The husband immediately offered her will for
probate and their child filed a motion for summary judgment, requesting
the court to deny the will probate since more than four years had passed
since the decedent's death. The trial court granted the motion for sum-
mary judgment. The appeals court noted that whether the will's propo-
nent defaulted in not offering the will for probate is usually a fact issue.83
The court further noted that courts have been lenient in allowing probate
as a muniment of title if the proponent has an excuse for his failure to
probate the will, especially when, as in this case, the probate of the will
completes the chain of title to real property.84 The court held that the
husband's testimony created a fact issue and that the trial court improp-
erly granted summary judgment denying probate.85
B. CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE
In Bailey v. Cherokee County Appraisal Dist.86 the court determined
that ad valorem taxes that accrued during the administration of the estate
constituted claims against the estate and that the probate court had exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the claims.87 The decedent died intestate in 1973,
survived by his wife and his two sons. The decedent and his wife owned
land located in Cherokee County as community property. The decedent's
wife served as dependent administrator of his estate. The decedent's wife
failed to pay property taxes on the Cherokee County property for the
years 1976 through 1986, and the taxing authorities filed suit in district
court against the wife and the sons, jointly and severally, requesting a
personal judgment for the taxes, plus interest and fees. The estate contin-
ued under administration during the years in which the taxes were not
paid and at the time of the suit. The district court ordered foreclosure of
the tax liens, but denied personal judgment against the wife and sons.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case, holding that per-
sonal judgment against the wife and sons was appropriate. 88 The Texas
Supreme Court held that ad valorem taxes that accrued during estate ad-
ministration were claims against the estate.89 The court further held that
the heirs had no personal liability for the taxes.90 The court then deter-
mined that because the unpaid taxes represented a claim against the de-
cedent's estate, the county court at law, not the district court, had
83. 881 S.W.2d at 137.
84. Id.
85. Id at 137-38.
86. 862 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. 1993).
87. Id at 582, 586.
88. 817 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tex. App.-yler 1991), rev'd, 862 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. 1993).
89. 862 S.W.2d at 583; see San Antonio Say. Ass'n v. Beaudry, 769 S.W.2d 277, 281
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied); Oldham v. Keaton, 592 S.W.2d 938,
945 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
90. 862 S.W.2d at 584. The court examined the taxing authorities' argument that the
property immediately vested in the heirs, so the heirs should be personally liable on the
taxes, and determined that the administrator of the estate held legal title to the property
and thus was liable for payment of the taxes. Id.
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jurisdiction over the case.91 The court held that the estate was liable for
the payments of the ad valorem taxes during the period of estate adminis-
tration, that the heirs had no personal liability for the taxes, and that the
county court at law had exclusive jurisdiction over the claim for unpaid
taxes.
92
In Cornerstone Bank, N.A. v. Randle93 the court examined whether an
assignee of the State of Texas may recover for payment of inheritance
taxes to the State either directly from the decedent's surviving spouse,
who occupied the decedent's separate property residence as his home-
stead, or by foreclosing on the surviving spouse's homestead interest.94
Under the terms of her will the decedent left all of her property to her
son and named her son independent executor. The decedent's husband
survived her and continued to live in her separate property residence
under his constitutional95 and statutory96 homestead rights. The son, as
independent executor, borrowed money from the bank for taxes and ad-
ministration expenses and gave the bank a deed of trust on the residence.
The son later defaulted on payment of the note, and bank bought the
son's remainder interest from the trustee at public sale. The son also
failed to pay inheritance tax to the State of Texas on his mother's estate.
The bank paid the tax to preserve its investment in the remainder interest
and received an assignment of the State's claim for the tax, including a
lien on the estate's property. The bank filed suit against the husband, in
which it sought to foreclose the husband's homestead right in the resi-
dence and recover reimbursement for payment of the inheritance tax.
The trial court granted the husband's motion for summary judgment
against the bank. The appeals court first determined that the husband
had no personal liability for payment of the inheritance tax because he
91. Id at 585. The court cited TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(c) (Vernon Supp. 1995) as
the basis for its determination that the district court has no jurisdiction over probate mat-
ters in counties with statutory courts that exercise probate jurisdiction. 862 S.W.2d at 585.
The court disagreed with the taxing authorities' contention that the district court had juris-
diction since a court can have jurisdiction only if the probate matter is pending in the
district court at the time the cause of action is filed. Id The court finally found that the
county court at law had dominant jurisdiction over other courts with concurrent jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 586.
92. 862 S.W.2d at 586. The dissent would have found that no reason existed for the
continued administration of the estate. Id. at 587 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). Further, the
dissent believed that the claim for unpaid ad valorem taxes did not represent a claim
against the estate since the decedent did not owe the taxes at the time of his death. Id. at
587, 588. Because the property passed to the heirs immediately upon the decedent's death
pursuant to TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37 (Vernon Supp. 1995), the dissent would have
found that the two sons had personal liability for the taxes. Id. at 588 (Gonzales, J., dis-
senting). TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.07 (Vernon 1992 & Sup.p. 1995) provides that the
person owning or acquiring property on January 1 of the year for which the ad valorem
taxes are imposed has a personal obligation for payment of the tax. The dissent also would
have found that the district court had jurisdiction over the claim for unpaid taxes since the
taxing authority's claim was actually against the heirs individually and not against the es-
tate. 862 S.W.2d at 589 (Gonzales, J., dissenting).
93. 869 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ).
94. Id. at 582, 584-87.
95. TEX. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 52.
96. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 284 (Vernon 1980).
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did not acquire property subject to taxation.97 The court then deter-
mined that no lien attached to the husband's homestead right in the prop-
erty since the husband was not personally liable for the inheritance tax.98
The appeals court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of
the husband. 99
In Howe State Bank v. Crookham'00 the court held that the county
court in which the estate administration was pending held exclusive juris-
diction over a claim against the estate.101 The decedent executed a prom-
issory note, due one year from the date of the note, and payable to the
bank, in 1989. A certificate of deposit secured the promissory note. The
decedent died approximately two and one-half months before the due
date of the note. The county court in Grayson County admitted the dece-
dent's will to probate and appointed his wife and daughter as co-execu-
tors nine days before the due date of the note. The co-executors did not
pay the note on the due date. Almost a year later the county court con-
verted the administration into a dependent administration and appointed
the wife and daughter as co-administrators with will annexed. Several
months later the bank filed an authenticated claim with the co-adminis-
trators and requested that they treat the note as a matured, secured
claim. The co-administrators almost immediately rejected the claim and
filed a memorandum of rejection with the county court. The bank filed
suit on the claim in district court in Grayson County. The co-administra-
tors filed a please to jurisdiction as well as their answer. The district court
found that it had no jurisdiction and the bank appealed. The appeals
court held that the bank filed suit on its claim under Probate Code sec-
tion 313,102 which states that the claimant may file suit in the court of
original probate jurisdiction or in any other court of proper jurisdic-
tion.103 The bank alleged that the district court was a court of proper
jurisdiction. The appeals court examined sections 5 and 5A of the Pro-
bate Code, 1°4 as well as Bailey v. Cherokee County Appraisal Dist. ,105 and
97. 869 S.W.2d at 586. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 211.108 (Vernon 1992) provides that
any person who acquires property subject to the inheritance tax is personally liable for
payment of the tax to the extent of the value of the property acquired. The bank con-
tended that the husband acquired the homestead property as the result of his wife's death.
The court found that although the value of the homestead property is included in deter-
mining the amount of the inheritance tax, 869 S.W.2d at 586, the husband had a vested
homestead right prior to his wife's death, so he did not acquire the homestead interest as
the result of her death. Id. at 586.
98. 869 S.W.2d at 586. The court also held that neither the state inheritance tax nor
the federal estate tax are taxes on property for purposes of TEX. CONsT. art. XVI, § 50, so
the bank could not foreclose on the husband's homestead interest. 869 S.W.2d at 587.
99. 869 S.W.2d at 587.
100. 873 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ).
101. Id. at 750.
102. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 313 (Vernon 1980).
103. 873 S.W.2d at 746.
104. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 5, 5A (Vernon Supp. 1995).




concluded that only the county court in which the probate cause was
pending had jurisdiction to hear a claim.10 6
C. Res Judicata
In Coble Wall Trust Co. v. Palmer'0 7 the court examined a res judicata
defense in a cause of action filed in a probate case. 108 The probate court
appointed the trust company guardian of the estate of the decedent, who
was then elderly and incompetent. The decedent owned significant
amounts of real property with a high appraised value, but very little cash
and liquid assets. The trust company, in conjunction with the benefi-
ciaries under the decedent's will, and with the approval of the probate
court, implemented an estate plan designed to provide liquidity to the
estate for payment of the projected estate and inheritance taxes, as well
as administration expenses, and to reduce the total taxes through making
gifts to the beneficiaries during the decedent's life. The beneficiaries,
with their attorneys, reviewed and approved the estate plan prior to the
probate court's approval. The decedent died soon after the probate
court's approval of the estate plan, and the court appointed the trust com-
pany temporary administrator for the purpose of implementing the estate
plan. The court later appointed a permanent independent administrator
of the estate. The independent administrator and the beneficiaries ob-
jected to the guardian's final account, which documented the transactions
implementing the estate plan. The probate court held a hearing on the
objections, including objections to the amount of the guardian's fees and
expenses and the valuation of assets. The probate court approved the
final account and discharged the guardian. The independent administra-
tor and beneficiaries did not appeal the probate court's order. The in-
dependent administrator and beneficiaries later objected to the trust
company's final account as temporary administrator, and the probate
court again held a hearing on the matter, after which it approved the final
account. The independent administrator and beneficiaries again did not
appeal the probate court's order. The independent administrator and the
beneficiaries sold the majority of the real property, which was security for
debt obtained to pay taxes and administration expenses, to a party that
defaulted on the loan. Due to lack of liquidity in the estate, the in-
dependent administrator and heirs did not meet their quarterly payment
obligations on the loan and the lending institution posted the land for
foreclosure. The independent administrator and beneficiaries sought an
injunction against the foreclosure, which the probate court granted. The
lending institution appealed that order, and the appeals court, in San
106. 873 S.W.2d at 747-50.
107. 859 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ denied).
108. Id. at 479-81.
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Antonio Savings Ass'n v. Palmer,10 9 reversed the probate court. 110 The
independent administrator then brought suit in the probate court against
the president of the trust company and the trust company, as the former
temporary administrator, alleging negligence, gross negligence, and viola-
tions of the deceptive trades practices act."' The probate court entered
judgment based on the jury's verdict for the independent administrator.
The appeals court did not consider the res judicata defense that the trust
company argued, both at the trial level and on appeal. 112 The Texas
Supreme Court held that the probate court had subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the case and reversed the court of appeals. 113 On remand, the
appeals court found that the independent administrator did not appeal
the orders approving the final accounting of the guardian and the final
accounting of the temporary administrator, which followed hearings at
which the independent administrator raised all of the allegations con-
tained in the later causes of action." 4 The appeals court held that the
orders approving the final accounts, which the independent administrator
and beneficiaries did not appeal, served as res judicata to all of the causes
of action the independent administrator later raised." 5
D. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
In Elick v. Woods 1 6 the court determined that the personal representa-
tives of a decedent's estate had the authority to wind up the professional
corporation's affairs, sell the assets, and dissolve the corporation. 1 7 The
decedent was the sole shareholder in a professional corporation that pro-
vided legal services. The decedent's stock in the professional corporation
109. 780 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied). For a discussion of
this case, see Lynne M. Candler, Wills and Trusts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J.
671, 686-88 (1991).
110. Id. at 803.
111. Tnx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.46 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
112. Coble Wall Trust Co. v. Palmer, 848 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992).
The appeals court reversed the trial court and rendered judgment on the grounds that the
probate court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the suit. Id. at 703, 710.
113. 851 S.W.2d 178, 182-83 (Tex. 1992). For discussions of this case, see Lynne M.
Candler, Wills and Trusts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 47 SMU L. REv. 1717, 1729 (1994);
Lynne M. Candler, Wills and Trusts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46 SMU L. REv. 1831,
1846-47 (1993).
114. 859 S.W.2d at 479. The court found that the independent administrator could not
collaterally attack the orders through the causes of action alleged in the suit against the
trust company and its president. Id. The probate court heard evidence concerning the
trust company's fees, as well as the effectiveness and expense of the estate plan, at the
hearings on the final accounts, and the probate court heard all of the allegations that the
independent administrator later brought against the trust company and its president in the
hearings on the final accounts. See id. at 480.
115. Id. at 480-81. The court further found that the jury's findings did not support the
independent administrator's claims of violations of the Deceptive Trades Practices Act, id.
at 481, and that no evidence existed to support the jury's findings that the trust company
and its president breached a fiduciary duty to the estate and its beneficiaries during the
administration of the estate and that the breach resulted in damages to the estate and
beneficiaries. Id. at 482.
116. 859 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, writ denied).
117. Id. at 461.
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was partly separate property and partly community property. The dece-
dent left his separate property to his children and his community property
to his wife. The decedent and his wife died together in an airplane crash.
One of the decedent's daughters, who was also an attorney, alleged that
she should immediately receive her one-twelfth ownership interest in the
decedent's stock, and that, since none of the other beneficiaries of the
two estates were attorneys, the corporation should redeem all of the re-
maining stock from the estates. The daughter relied upon article 1528e,
section 14, of the Revised Civil Statutes 18 for her argument that only she
could serve as an officer or director of the corporation and that the cor-
poration must purchase or redeem all shares other than those that repre-
sented her share of her father's interest. The trial court held that the
professional corporation stock was an asset of the two estates and that
the administrators of the two estates had the sole right to control the
stock during the period of estate administration, including the right to
serve as officers, directors, and shareholders of the corporation for pur-
poses of winding up corporate affairs and selling assets or stock of the
corporation. The trial court found that the administrators could not pro-
vide legal services during their administration of the stock. The trial
court further found that the attorney daughter was not a shareholder of
the corporation and that she did not have the right to compel the per-
sonal representatives of the two estates'to sell corporate stock to her or to
the corporation itself. The appeals court examined article 1528e, section
14119 and determined that the statute specifically allowed for a personal
representative to wind up a professional corporation's affairs, sell the as-
sets or the stock, and dissolve the corporation.120
In O'Dinniley v. Golden'2l the court ordered the trial judge to rule on
a surviving child's motion for appointment as successor personal repre-
sentative. 22 The decedent died testate in 1986. His wife served as in-
dependent executor of the estate until her death in June 1992. The
decedent's daughter determined that the estate owed two or more claims
and that causes of action on behalf of the estate required the appoint-
ment of a personal representative. The daughter filed a motion for ap-
pointment as successor personal representative. The decedent's son and
only other surviving heir waived his right to appointment and requested
that the court appoint his sister personal representative. The court held a
hearing on the motion in July 1992 and took the motion under advise-
ment. In late August 1992 the court set the estate for a final hearing and
distribution in November 1992. The daughter filed an amended motion
for appointment as successor personal representative, along with a pro-
118. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528e, § 14 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
119. Id.
120. 859 S.W.2d at 461. The court found that the legislature could not have intended to
vest all ownership interests in a beneficiary or heir who happened to practice the same
profession as the decedent, to the exclusion of the other beneficiaries or heirs. Id.
121. 860 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1993, no writ).
122. Id at 270.
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posed order appointing her. The daughter also objected to the final dis-
tribution of the estate since she had provided evidence on the continuing
need for estate administration at the July 1992 hearing. The daughter
sought a writ of mandamus in November 1992 to compel the court to
appoint her as successor personal representative. The judge responded
and stated that he would appoint the daughter. The daughter filed an-
other motion to set a hearing on her motion for appointment, but the
court did not rule on the motion. The daughter again sought mandamus
relief. The appeals court held that the judge had not ruled on the motion
within a reasonable period of time and that the daughter did not have a
remedy at law for the judge's failure.123 The court ordered the judge to
rule on the daughter's motion for appointment of personal representa-
tive, but declined to order the court to appoint the daughter successor
personal representative. 124
In Allison v. FDIC125 the court examined the issue of whether a judg-
ment creditor of the beneficiaries of an estate had standing to seek re-
moval of the independent administrator. 126 A brother and sister were the
only two beneficiaries of the decedent's estate. Their mother served as
successor independent administrator of the estate from 1986 until the
court removed her in October 1992. The decedent's will provided that
her estate would be held in trusts for the benefit of the beneficiaries until
the brother attained age thirty, which occurred in July 1992. The FDIC
held a judgment against the brother and sister, as well as against a part-
nership of the brother and sister. At the time of her appointment as suc-
cessor administrator, the mother believed that her only duties would be
to resolve tax issues and deliver the estate to the trustees of the trusts.
The trustees, however, resigned and no other trustee agreed to serve.
The mother liquidated the estate assets and moved them to a bank in
Liechtenstein, presumably in an effort to keep the assets from the
brother's and sister's creditors. The mother later brought the assets back
into the United States and invested them in annuities. The FDIC alleged
that the purchase of annuities amounted to a conspiracy between the
mother, brother and sister to hinder or defraud the FDIC as the brother's
and sister's creditors and sought to remove the mother as independent
administrator. In May 1992 the trial court granted the FDIC's requested
restraining order and later enjoined the independent administrator from
dissipating the estate. The trial court, following a hearing, removed the
mother as independent administrator in October 1992. The mother con-
tended on appeal that the FDIC did not have standing to seek her re-
moval. The appeals court, basing its decision upon construction of the
language of Probate Code section 3(r), 127 determined that the FDIC did
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 861 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ dism'd by agr.).
126. Id. at 9-10.
127. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(r) (Vernon 1980).
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not have standing as an interested person in the decedent's estate and,
thus, could not seek removal of the independent administrator.128
In McLendon v. McLendon129 the court considered the alleged breach
of fiduciary duty award by independent co-executors of the decedent's
will.130 The decedent's husband, son, and grandson built a successful
business enterprise, consisting of a general partnership and a limited part-
nership, over many years. The decedent's husband died in 1982 and the
decedent was actively involved in the business, along with the grandson,
from the time of her husband's death to her own death in 1985. The
probate court appointed the grandson and a long-time employee in-
dependent co-executors of the decedent's will. Following the decedent's
death, the partners amended the partnership agreements of both partner-
ships. The son and grandson, who were general partners of both partner-
ships, the independent executor of the husband's estate, and the co-
executors of the decedent's estate signed the partnership amendments.
The amendments provided that the general partner could expel any part-
ner that questioned any management decisions made by the general part-
ner. One of the grandson's two sisters sued the co-executors for
mismanagement of the decedent's estate and contested the validity of the
partnership amendments. The co-executors notified the sister that she
lost her interest in the estate under the terms of the in terrorem clause
contained in the will. The other sister intervened and the two sisters al-
leged that the co-executors breached their fiduciary duty and requested
the removal of the co-executors, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and
an accounting and distribution of the estate. The sisters further sought,
among other things, a ruling that they had not violated the terms of the in
terrorem clause. The jury found that the co-executors breached their fi-
duciary duties and awarded the sisters actual damages and punitive dam-
ages against their brother. The jury further awarded attorney's fees to
the sisters. The probate court entered a judgment based on the verdict
for the sisters and awarded them attorney's fees. The probate court did
not enter judgment concerning the applicability of the in terrorem clause.
The appeals court held that evidence existed to support the jury's finding
that the brother breached his fiduciary duty,131 and further determined
that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the jury's finding of
breach of fiduciary duty.132 The appeals court held that the evidence sup-
ported the jury's finding of exemplary damages.' 33 The court also found
128. 861 S.W.2d at 10.
129. 862 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied).
130. Id. at 669-71.
131. Id. at 670.
132. Id. at 671. The sisters' expert testified that the partnership amendments reduced
the value of their interests in the partnerships and eliminated their ability to terminate the
partnerships. The brother's expert testified that the partnership interests increased in
value following the amendments to the agreements. The appeals court noted the differ-
ence of opinion between the experts and concluded that it could not substitute its judgment
for the jury's finding. Id.
133. Id at 672.
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that the probate court had discretion to award attorney's fees to the sis-
ters.' 34 Upon consideration of the sisters' cross-points the court deter-
mined that the amendments to the partnership agreements were not
invalid, 135 that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to re-
move the co-executors, 136 and that the claims brought by the sisters did
not fall within the purview of the will's in terrorem clause.' 37
In Lawyers Surety Corp. v. Larson138 the court determined that Pro-
bate Code section 245139 permits the payment of attorney's fees by the
surety of an administrator removed for his failure to perform his duties
properly.' 40 A wife and her husband both died intestate within four
months of each other. The court appointed one of their sons as adminis-
trator of both estates. Lawyers Surety served as surety on the son's bond
in each estate. The son filed inventories in each estate, which the court
approved. One of the decedents' daughters objected to the inventories
after their approval and requested new inventories. The administrator
filed amended inventories in each estate, which the court approved. The
administrator also filed a joint annual account for the two estates, which
he amended some two months after filing. The daughter filed a second
complaint and requested the court to remove the administrator and ap-
point a successor. The court held a hearing on the daughter's motion and
found that the son had mismanaged the property of the estates and had
violated several statutory duties. The court removed the son and ap-
pointed the daughter as successor administrator. The daughter posted
her bonds and then brought suit against the former administrator for
breach of duty. The daughter claimed damages against the surety com-
pany. The parties agreed to dismiss the claims for damages, but the claim
for attorney's fees and costs proceeded to trial. The court awarded al-
most $12,000 in fees and costs in each estate. The surety company ap-
pealed. The appeals court first held that any alleged nonconformity in
the daughter's bonds did not preclude her from pursuing a cause of action
to recover costs for correcting the improprieties conducted by the former
134. Id. at 673. The sisters did not segregate their attorney's fees between those for
which they could recover and those for which they could not. Normally, a party may not
receive attorney's fees for claims that are not recoverable. The court, citing Steward Title
Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Tex. 1991), found that an exception to this rule
exists if the fees arise out of the same events and are so interrelated that the same facts
prove or deny the claims. McLendon, 862 S.W.2d at 673. The court found that the facts of
this case fell within the exception to the rule requiring segregation of attorney's fees and
that the probate court did not abuse its discretion through not requiring segregation of the
fees. Id. at 674.
135. 862 S.W.2d at 677.
136. Id. at 678.
137. Id. at 679. The court found that the sisters' alleged causes of action against the co-
executors in their fiduciary capacity and for a declaratory judgment about the validity of
the partnership amendments did not constitute a will contest and thus did not violate the in
terrorem clause. Id.
138. 869 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, no writ).
139. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 245 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
140. 869 S.W.2d at 654.
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administrator. 141 The court next held that Probate Code section 245142
allows a successor personal representative to recover attorney's fees for
both the removal of a personal representative and bringing the estate into
statutory compliance.' 43 The court also determined that sufficient evi-
dence supported the probate court's award of attorney's fees. 44
In Oadra v. Stegall 45 the court determined the ownership of two ac-
counts established by the decedent. 46 The decedent, using his funds, es-
tablished a savings account styled in his name and his mother's name as
co-trustees. The signature card for the account named the beneficiaries
of the account as the decedent, his son, his daughter, and her two chil-
dren. The decedent and his mother also established a smaller account,
again with the decedent's funds. Shortly after the decedent's death, his
mother closed the trust account and moved the funds into a new account
in her name only. The trial court found that the funds in both accounts
belonged to the decedent's estate. The appeals court reversed the trial
court's conclusion as to the trust account and held that the decedent's
mother owned the funds in the trust account.' 47 The Texas Supreme
Court held that the funds in the trust account belonged to the decedent's
estate.' 48 On remand the appeals court first determined that the two-
year statute of limitations did not bar the estate's claims for damages. 149
The court then determined that the jury correctly found that the decedent
did not make a gift of the trust funds to his mother because the mother
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent in-
tended to make a gift and that the decedent delivered the funds to her.' 50
The court finally held that the decedent funded the trust account solely
with his funds and that his mother contributed no funds to the account. 51
141. Id. at 651. The daughter voluntarily posted amended bonds prior to the trial. The
court found that the probate court's approval of the bonds gave the daughter her authority
to pursue the cause of action. Id. The court also noted that the proper forum for attacking
the bonds was the probate court, whether in an action for removal or a request for a re-
placement bond. Id.
142. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 245 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
143. 869 S.W.2d at 652. The surety company urged the court to accept its contention
that the successor administrator could only recover attorney's fees incurred through forc-
ing the prior personal representative to comply with his statutory duties. The court de-
clined to accept the surety company's argument. Id. at 652-53.
144. Id. at 654.
145. 871 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
146. Id. at 886.
147. Oadra v. Stegall, 828 S.W.2d 460, 466 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992),
rev'd, Stegall v. Oadra, 868 SW.2d 290 (Tex. 1993). For a discussion of the previous ap-
peals court decision, see Lynne M. Candler, Wills and Trusts, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
46 SMU L. REV. 1831, 1854-55 (1993)
148. Stegall v. Oadra, 868 S.W.2d 290, 293 (Tex. 1993).
149. 871 S.W.2d at 887. The court held that the statute of limitations did not apply
because the estate did not have to file suit to recover funds that actually belonged to the
estate. Id.
150. Id at 892.
151. Id. at 894. The mother signed the signature care as a grantor of the trust, but the
court found that the jury had sufficient evidence presented to establish that the mother did
not contribute any funds to the account. Id.
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In Garcia v. Garcia152 the court considered the allowance of attorney's
fees in an action removing an executor.153 The testator died in 1976. One
of the testator's sons served as independent executor until his subsequent
death, except for a brief period when a daughter served as temporary
administrator for purposes of canceling deeds from the testator to the son
serving as executor. After the executor's death, the court appointed an-
other son as successor executor. The second son attempted to convert the
principal and interest of savings bonds held in the testator's name and
also failed to file accountings with the court. The wife of the deceased
son filed an application to compel an accounting of the estate in 1986,
which was the only accounting the successor executor filed and which did
not balance. The wife filed a motion to remove the successor executor in
1990, which the court granted because the successor executor failed to file
fiduciary income tax returns, pay ad valorem taxes or estate taxes, and
make final settlement of the estate. The court also found that the succes-
sor executor grossly mismanaged the estate. The court appointed a suc-
cessor administrator and ordered the executor to deliver the assets of the
estate to the administrator. The administrator also failed to file a court-
ordered inventory and accounting until after the wife of the first son filed
a motion to have the administrator removed for his failure to file the
reports. The court held a hearing concerning the objections to the ac-
counting and payments to the successor executor for his services as exec-
utor, as well as payments to the successor executor for attorney's fees for
defending his fiduciary position, and for payment of the first son's wife's
attorney's fees. The court allowed both sides their attorney's fees and
also allowed the successor executor compensation for his services. The
first son's wife then attempted to surcharge the successor executor for
losses incurred during the time he served as executor, but the trial court
rejected the application for surcharge, concluding that the wife did not
controvert the evidence the successor executor gave concerning the sav-
ings bonds. The wife appealed. The appeals court held that the trial
court incorrectly placed the burden of proof on the applicant for
surcharge rather than on the successor executor, and remanded the case
to the trial court so that the successor executor would have the opportu-
nity to produce evidence concerning his expenses and account for the
estate's finances during the time he served.154 The appeals court held
that the successor executor defended his removal in good faith and that
the trial court correctly awarded him his attorney's fees in connection
with the removal action.' 55
152. 878 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
153. Id. at 679-81.
154. Id. at 680.
155. Id. The court remanded the issue of all other attorney's fees, id., but held that the
first son's wife could not have her attorney's fees surcharged against the successor executor
individually. Id. at 680-81.
1518 [Vol. 48
PROBATE AND TRUSTS
In Estate of Townes v. Townes156 the court determined that a son
breached his fiduciary duty to his mother when he took funds from his
mother's accounts and converted them for his own use. 157 One of the
decedent's sons cared for her and assisted her with her financial matters
following the death of his uncle, who had assisted the decedent following
her husband's death. The son was a signatory on a bank account and a
brokerage account. During the years that her son assisted the decedent,
the son distributed over $440,000 from the decedent's accounts to or for
the benefit of himself. The decedent also distributed significant funds to
two of the decedent's other surviving children. Following the decedent's
death the probate court appointed the son executor of her estate. The
son died shortly after his mother, however, and two of the decedent's
other surviving children qualified as co-administrators of her estate. Af-
ter reviewing the decedent's records the co-administrators sued the estate
of the son who had assisted his mother for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud,
conversion of property, and unjust enrichment. The probate court, based
upon the jury's findings, entered a take nothing judgment against the co-
administrators. The appeals court held that the evidence presented to the
jury did not overcome the presumption that the son's withdrawal of funds
from his mother's account was a breach of fiduciary duty.158 The court
also held that no evidence existed to support the jury's finding that an
implied agreement existed between the decedent and her son concerning
distributions of account funds to him.159 Finally, the court held that the
son converted the funds through his withdrawals, but that the evidence
supported the jury's finding that his wife did not convert the funds. 160
V. GUARDIANSHIPS
In Garland v. Garland161 the court held that a statutory probate court
has jurisdiction over guardianship proceedings for an adult incompetent
child.' 62 The proposed ward, who was twenty-two years old when his fa-
ther filed the application for guardianship in the probate court, had
Down's syndrome. The ward's parents divorced when he was sixteen
and the family district court appointed his mother as his managing con-
156. 867 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
157. Id at 418, 419-20.
158. Id. at 418. The court held, therefore, that the probate court erred when it failed to
enter a judgment n.o.v. for the co-administrators, Id
159. Id. at 419.
160. Id. at 420. The dissent would have affirmed the judgment except for one of the
withdrawals, made while the decedent was in a coma. Id. at 420 (Morse, J., dissenting).
The dissent expressed concern over placing the presumption of unfairness on the son's
estate when both the son and his mother, the only two persons who might have known of
an agreement, were deceased. Id. at 421. The dissent felt that this presumption could
present an impossible burden of proof for the son's estate. Id. The dissent would have
affirmed the probate court's judgment except in connection with the last withdrawal the
son made, while the decedent was in a coma, and the dissent would have rendered judg-
ment against the son's estate in the amount of the last withdrawal. Id. at 427.
161. 868 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ).
162. Id. at 850.
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servator. The family district court also ordered the father to continue
child support payments beyond the ward's age of majority due to his con-
dition. The father filed an application with the probate court, seeking
appointment as guardian of the ward's estate. The mother contested the
application and asserted that the probate court had no jurisdiction over
the matter since the family district court had exclusive continuing juris-
diction. The probate court dismissed the guardianship proceeding based
upon a lack of jurisdiction. The appeals court held that the Probate
Code 163 granted exclusive jurisdiction over guardianship matters to the
probate court. 164 The court held that the family district court's continu-
ing jurisdiction over the father's support of the ward did not vest the fam-
ily district court with jurisdiction over the guardianship proceedings. 165
In Youngs v. Choice'66 the court considered the probate court's rulings
on actions for removal of the guardian and partition of real property. 67
The court appointed the ward's granddaughter permanent guardian of
the person and estate of the ward in 1988. In 1989 the guardian sued her
mother, the ward's daughter, for partition of property that the ward and
daughter owned, reimbursement, rents, waste of the property, and taxes.
The daughter's answer requested that the probate court deny the parti-
tion and either terminate the guardianship or remove the guardian. The
guardian served the daughter with discovery, including requests for ad-
missions. The probate court informed the daughter on at least two occa-
sions that she must respond to all discovery and that the court would
sanction her if she did not. The daughter, who represented herself with-
out counsel, did not respond to the discovery. The probate court granted
partial summary judgments granting the partition of the real property and
denying termination of the guardianship or removal of the guardian. The
appeals court first held that it could not review the daughter's allegation
that the initial appointment of the guardian violated the ward's due pro-
cess rights. 168 The court next held that the probate court did not err in its
failure to remove the guardian since the daughter did not respond to the
requests for admissions, which resulted in deemed admissions. 169 The
163. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(c) (Vernon Supp. 1995) and TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 606 (Vernon Supp. 1995) grant jurisdiction to the statutory probate court over guardian-
ship matters.
164. 868 S.W.2d at 849.
165. Id. at 850. The court noted that TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051 (Vernon Supp.
1995) provides for continuing support obligations for a disabled adult child and that the
family district court would have continuing jurisdiction over the support obligation. 868
S.W.2d at 850. The court determined, however, that the ward was no longer a child within
the meaning of TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.01(1) (Vernon Supp. 1995), so the probate
court had exclusive jurisdiction over the guardianship proceedings. 868 S.W.2d at 850.
166. 868 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
167. Id. at 852-54.
168. Id. at 852-53. The court held that the daughter did not raise this claim in a timely
manner, id. at 852, and that she did not forward the record of the guardianship proceedings
from the trial court. Id. at 853.
169. Id. at 853. The probate court, based upon the deemed admissions, granted the
guardian's motion for summary judgment. The appeals court held that the probate court's
action was proper. Id
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court then held that the probate court properly granted the summary
judgment on the issue of the partition of the real property.170 The court
finally held that the probate court's determination that the unanswered
requests for admission were deemed admitted and that the assessment of




In Newman v. Link 172 the court imposed a constructive trust over an
award of attorney's fees to the guardian ad litem who represented a mi-
nor child. 173 In Bransom v. Standard Hardware, Inc.174 the court deter-
mined that the homestead provisions of the Texas Constitution 75 do not
prevent the imposition of a constructive trust over the proceeds of the
170. Id at 853-54. The daughter did not respond to the requests for admissions. The
probate court thus deemed that the daughter admitted that she jointly owned the land with
the ward, that the land could be partitioned, and that a partition would not disturb her
homestead rights. The probate court specifically ordered that the partition protect the
daughter's homestead rights. The appeals court held that the probate court had no issue of
material fact before it and could order partition by summary judgment. Id. at 854.
171. Itt The court found that the daughter did not bring forward an Order of Sanctions
for appellate review. Id.
172. 866 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
173. Id. at 725-26. The appellant represented the father of an injured child in a per-
sonal injury case. The trial court appointed the appellee as guardian ad litem to represent
the interests of the child. The parties settled the case and the trial court awarded appellee
part of his fees from the defendant and part from the father's attorney. The trial court
provided, in an amended judgment approving the settlement agreement, that it awarded
part of the ad litem's fees against the father's attorney in part because the father's attorney
had almost allowed the dismissal of the case for want of prosecution, the ad litem's vigor-
ous representation of the child's interests led to the settlement, and the ad litem expended
a great amount of time in efforts that the father's attorney should have undertaken. The
appellant did not object to the court's order at the hearing on the settlement agreement
and did not appeal from the judgment approving the settlement agreement. The appellant
failed, however, to pay the appellee any of his portion of the ad litem fees. The appellant
filed an action against appellee based on the award of ad litem's fees. The appellee an-
swered, alleging the affirmative defense of estoppel and the affirmative defense of fraud,
and counterclaimed for, among other things, conversion, unjust enrichment, fraud, and
constructive trust. The jury awarded the appellee damages for mental anguish, as well as
the actual damages in the amount of the ad litem's fee and punitive damages. The appeals
court held that the evidence presented conclusively established that the appellant con-
verted the ad litem's fees, that his actions amounted to constructive fraud, and that the
conversion resulted in unjust enrichment. Id at 726. The appeals court held that recovery
was not statutorily barred. The appeals court also held that the appellant acted with malice
and upheld the punitive damages. Id at 727.
174. 874 S.W.2d 919 (Tex.. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied).
175. TEx. CON T. art. XVI, § 50.
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sale of the homestead. 176 In Mauriceville Nat'l Bank v. Zernia1177 the
court upheld the imposition of a constructive trust over a contractor's
account held for the benefit of subcontractors. 178
In Qualia v. Qualia179 the court determined that the district court had
jurisdiction over a claim of conversion and for imposition of a construc-
tive trust over the assets of a decedent's estate. 180 The decedent died
testate, and the county court of Val Verde County admitted her will to
probate and appointed an independent executor. The county court later
entered an order discharging the executor and closing the estate. Two of
the beneficiaries of the estate filed a motion to reopen the estate for an
accounting. The county court transferred the cause to the county court at
law, which granted the motion for sixty days, after which the estate again
176. 874 S.W.2d at 928. An officer and director of a hardware store embezzled approxi-
mately $480,000 during the period that she also served as controller and bookkeeper of the
store. The hardware store sued the ex-officer and her husband for recovery of the embez-
zled funds and for punitive damages. The trial court entered judgment against the ex-
officer, which was not part of this appeal, and her husband, which was the subject of this
appeal, awarding the hardware store actual damages, punitive damages, and prejudgment
interest against the husband. The trial court also imposed a constructive trust on the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the couple's homestead, which the couple had deposited in the
registry of the court. The appeals court held that the evidence did not prove that the
husband had constructive knowledge of his wife's fraud and reversed the trial court's
award of actual damages based on actual or constructive fraud. Id. at 926. The court then
determined that the trial court's judgment for actual damages was based in part on unjust
enrichment, which the husband did not appeal. Id. at 927. The husband could not chal-
lenge the award based on unjust enrichment because he had not presented such a point of
error. Id. The court, however, held that unjust enrichment alone could not support a judg-
ment for punitive damages and reversed the award of punitive damages. Id. at 927-28. The
court then held that the trial court correctly imposed a constructive trust over the proceeds
from the sale of the couple's homestead because the homestead exemption could not be
used to protect stolen funds. Id. at 928; see Curtis Sharp Custom Homes, Inc. v. Glover,
701 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Akin, J., dissenting); Pace v.
McEwen, 617 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], no writ); Baucum v.
Texas Oil Corp., 423 S.W.2d 434,442 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The
court found that the stolen funds used to reduce the principal on the debt of the homestead
did not obtain homestead characteristics. 874 S.W.2d at 928, citing First State Bank v.
Zelesky, 262 S.W.190, 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1924, no writ); Smith v. Green, 243
S.W. 1006, 1008 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1922, no writ). The court further found that
the husband's innocence of fraud or constructive fraud did not prevent the imposition of a
constructive trust. Bransom, 874 S.W.2d at 928. The court acknowledged that the result it
reached differed from that of the majority in Curtis Sharp Custom Homes. Id. (citing Cur-
tis Sharp, 701 S.W.2d at 28).
177. 880 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, no writ).
178. Id. at 288. The contractor owed the bank monies, which, upon the contractor's
default, the bank withdrew from an account that the contractor held for the benefit of his
subcontractors. The subcontractors sued the bank and the trial court entered judgment for
the subcontractors. The bank appealed. The appeals court found that the bank had knowl-
edge that the contractor used the account to hold funds pending payment to subcontractors
and that the bank nevertheless refused to honor checks drawn on the account even after
receiving written notice of the nature of the account. Id. The court found that evidence
presented to the jury supported its finding that the bank had knowledge of the subcontrac-
tors' beneficial interest in the funds on deposit in the account and that unjust enrichment
would result if jury permitted the bank to keep the funds from the account. Id.
179. 878 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied).
180. Id. at 342. But cf. Stodder v. Evans, 860 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ
denied), supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
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closed by operation of law. The beneficiaries filed suit in district court
less than two weeks after the estate closed the second time, in which they
alleged that the executor mismanaged the estate, breached his fiduciary
duty, tortiously interfered with their inheritance rights, and converted es-
tate assets. The beneficiaries further requested the imposition of a con-
structive trust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the executor based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The appeals
court first determined that the district court had concurrent jurisdiction
with the county court under the Texas Constitution' 8 ' over probate mat-
ters.182 The court held that district courts have original jurisdiction over
trusts, except for the jurisdiction given statutory probate courts.183 Be-
cause the pleadings concerned conversion and the imposition of a con-
structive trust, and because no probate proceedings were pending at the
time of the suit, the district court had jurisdiction over the suit.184
B. REVOCABLE TRUSTS
In Runyan v. Mullins'8 5 the court considered whether the grantor's in-
structional letter concerning a trust amendment, taken with other docu-
ments the grantor did not sign, served to amend the trust agreement. 8 6
The grantor and his wife executed a trust agreement in 1978, which pro-
vided for the division into two trusts, the Survivor's Trust and the Dece-
dent's Trust, on the death of the first of them to die. The grantor's wife
died in 1983. The Survivor's Trust provided that the grantor could amend
or revoke the trust during his life by a written instrument that he deliv-
ered to the trustee. The grantor amended the Survivor's Trust in 1985. In
July 1991 the trustee sent a letter to the trust's attorney requesting that
the attorney draw a trust amendment and stating the terms of the amend-
ment, which included eliminating gifts to certain beneficiaries and substi-
tuting other beneficiaries. The trustee wrote the grantor about the
proposed trust agreement in August 1991. The trustee's letter to the
grantor did not contain the terms of the trust amendment, but instead
referenced the July letter to the attorney. The trustee stated that he had
enclosed a copy of the July letter to the attorney and a copy of his letter
to the grantor with the letter. The trustee requested that the grantor sign
the copy of the August letter indicating his approval of the trust amend-
ment. The trustee failed, however, to include a copy of either the July
letter to the attorney or his August letter to the grantor. The trustee later
forwarded a copy of the August letter to the grantor for the grantor's
signature approving the trust amendment, but still did not forward a copy
of the July letter to the attorney. The grantor signed a copy of the letter
as the trustee requested, but never signed and dated a copy of the July
181. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8.
182. 878 S.W.2d at 341.
183. Id. at 341-42 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 115.001 (Vernon 1984)).
184. 878 S.W.2d at 342.
185. 864 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ denied).
186. Id. at 786, 788-90.
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letter to the attorney. The trustee mailed the trust amendment to the
grantor on September 9, 1991, and requested to meet with the grantor to
discuss and execute the trust amendment. The grantor had a stroke on
September 18, 1991, and died on October 1, 1991, without executing the
trust amendment. The trustee filed an interpleader action to determine
the interests of the beneficiaries named prior to the 1991 trust amend-
ment and those named in the 1991 trust amendment. The trial court en-
tered summary judgment for the beneficiaries of the 1991 amendment.
The appeals court first held that summary judgment was appropriate be-
cause no issue of material fact existed. 187 The beneficiaries of the 1991
amendment alleged that the grantor executed and delivered a written in-
strument to the trustee sufficient to amend the trust when he signed the
copy of the trustee's August letter. The beneficiaries of the trust as it
existed prior to the 1991 amendment alleged that the signature on the
letter was insufficient to amend the trust. The appeals court held that the
grantor did not amend the trust through his execution of the August let-
ter, but merely expressed a possible intent to amend the trust.188 The
court reversed the trial court's summary judgment for the beneficiaries of
the alleged trust amendment and rendered judgment granting the sum-
mary judgment of the beneficiaries of the trust prior to the alleged
amendment. 189
In Soto v. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB 190 the court considered whether
the bank had the power to offset funds from a trust account for amounts
that the trustee/grantor of a revocable inter vivos trust owed to the
bank. 191 A couple established a trust account for the benefit of their
daughter in 1989. Both parents served as trustees of the trust and re-
tained the right either to revoke the trust or withdraw funds from the
account, if both acted in concert. Money from the mother's savings ac-
count initially funded the trust account. The couple established the ac-
count with the intent that neither could withdraw funds without the
other's consent as a protection for their daughter due to their marital
troubles. The mother never received a deposit agreement and she was
unaware of the bank's right to offset. The father overdrew his bank ac-
count at the bank that held the trust account, and the bank offset funds
from the trust account to cover the overdraft. The mother sued the bank
for damages, breach of bailment agreement, and conversion. The trial
court found that the bank could offset the funds. The appeals court held
that the trust account was a Totten, or tentative trust. 92 The court held
that creditors may reach the assets of a tentative trust to satisfy obliga-
tions of a trustee/settlor.193 The court also held that Texas authorities
187. Id. at 788.
188. Id. at 789-90.
189. Id. at 790.
190. 868 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ ref'd).
191. Idt at 401, 402-04.
192. It at 402.
193. Id. (citations omitted).
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holding that banks may not offset funds held for the benefit of other per-
sons do not apply to tentative trusts.194
C. SPENDTHRIFr TRUST
In Dierschke v. Central Nat'l Branch'95 the court considered whether
the trustee of a spendthrift trust could partition property owned by
spendthrift trusts without the approval of the beneficiaries.' 6  The
trustee and his wife owned an undivided one-half interest in real prop-
erty, with the trustee owning the other undivided interest in five trusts for
the benefit of his children. The bank held a lien on the couple's one-half
interest in the land. The trustee and his wife, pursuant to a bankruptcy
reorganization plan, entered into a partition agreement with the bank in
1989. The trustee also signed the agreement in his capacity as trustee of
the five trusts. The agreement provided that any party to the agreement
could demand partition after providing notice to the other owners. When
the trustee and his wife defaulted on their reorganization plan, the bank-
ruptcy stay was lifted and the bank foreclosed on its lien. The bank ob-
tained title to one-half of the land by trustee's deed in 1991. The bank
then attempted to enforce the partition agreement. The trial court en-
tered judgment for the bank and ordered the land partitioned. The
trustee appealed on the basis that he could not have legally entered the
partition agreement on behalf of the trusts because of the terms of the
trust instrument. The trustee specifically alleged that the bank was aware
of the spendthrift provisions of the trusts and that the trustee did not
have authority to enter the partition agreement without the consent or
ratification of the beneficiaries. The trustee also alleged that the trial
court abused its discretion because partition of the property resulted in
an economic loss to the beneficiaries. The appeals court reviewed both
the nature of partition and the nature of spendthrift trusts before reach-
ing its decision.1 97 The court held that the trustee had the ability to parti-
tion the land under the Trust Code 98 absent other provisions in the trust
document and that a trust's spendthrift provisions apply only to the bene-
ficiary, not to the trustee.' 99 The court held that the beneficiaries had no
right to notice of the partition since the partition affected only the right to
possession, not title to the property.200 The court also held that the parti-
194. Id at 403. See National Indemn. Co. v. Spring Branch State Bank, 162 Tex. 521,
348 S.W.2d 528, 529 (1961); Western Shoe Co. v. Amarillo Nat'l Bank, 127 Tex. 369, 94
S.W.2d 125, 128-29 (1936). The court concluded that since the couple owned the funds
held in the tentative trust, the bank could offset the funds. Soto, 868 S.W.2d at 403. The
court held that the couple's intent to make a gift to their daughter did not change the
bank's ability to deal with the account under the terms of the signature card. Id. at 404.
195. 876 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, no writ).
196. Id. at 379-82.
197. Id. at 379-80.
198. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.002(a) (Vernon 1984).
199. 876 S.W.2d at 380. The court further found that the trusts had no other provisions
that prevented the trustee from partitioning the property. Id at 380-81.
200. Id. at 381. The court further found that the trustee represented the beneficiaries'
interest, thus the beneficiaries were parties to the partition agreement. Id.
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tion caused no harm to the beneficiaries because since the trusts saved
the money of litigation over the partition and since they retained the
same amount of property following the partition as they had before.201
D. FIDUCIARY DUTY
In Johec v. Clayburne2°2 the court determined that the terms of a trust
document and the conduct of the parties may modify the trustee's fiduci-
ary duty.20 3 The grantor of the trusts in question decided to develop
ranch land that he owned, and he entered into a development agreement
with a developer. The grantor wished to retain a life income interest in
the development, and leave the remainder to his daughters. The grantor
consulted his accountant, who formed a corporation for the grantor,
which purchased portions of the property from the grantor. The account-
ant served as president of the corporation. The corporation bought the
property through notes secured by a deed of trust on the property. The
grantor then created trusts for the benefit of his two daughters and con-
tributed one-half of the corporate stock to each trust. The accountant
also served as trustee of the trusts. The developer and the corporation
agreed that the developer would manage the development of the prop-
erty. When the state's economy entered a downturn in the mid-1980s, the
developer failed to pay ad valorem taxes on the property. The account-
ant developed a plan to buy out the developer's interest in phases, with
the grantor's full knowledge. The financing for the purchase of the devel-
oper's interest was arranged by a partnership consisting of the accountant
and other shareholders of her accounting firm. The partnership received
an interest in the notes in addition to actual interest for providing the
financing. In addition, the corporation agreed to pay a monthly fee to the
partnership, pay all marketing and development expenses, all accounting
fees of the accounting firm, and the delinquent ad valorem taxes. The
daughters did not learn about the trusts until after the grantor's death,
when the daughters met with the accountant. The daughters sued the
accountant and the other members of her firm, alleging conspiracy and
breach of fiduciary duty. The jury found in favor of the daughters and
awarded actual damages and punitive damages against the accountant,
the other members of her firm, and the firm itself. The appeals court
examined the terms of the trust instrument and the trial court's instruc-
tion about fiduciary duty to determine if the trustee breached her duty to
the beneficiaries. 2°4 The appeals court held that the terms of the trust
agreement were ambiguous and that it must, therefore, consider the ac-
201. Id. at 382.
202. 863 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
203. Id. at 520.
204. Id. at 518-19. The trial court instructed the jury that a trustee has the following
duties: "(1) the duty not to self-deal, (2) the duty of fidelity, (3) the duty to exercise rea-
sonable skill and care, (4) the duty to preserve trust property, and (5) the duty to enforce
claims of the trust." Id. at 518.
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tions of the parties.205 The court held that the conduct of the parties
showed their intention that the provision of the trust agreement to mod-
ify the trustee's duty of fidelity.20 6 The court then determined that the
failure to include instructions on modification of the duty of fidelity re-
sulted in an improper judgment.207
E. SECTION 142 TRUST
In Aguilar v. Garcia20 8 the court held that the trial court could not
modify the terms of a trust created under Property Code section 142209 in
a manner not prescribed by the legislature. 210 Thirteen minor plaintiffs
received awards under a toxic tort action. The defendants paid the initial
installments into the registry of the court. The defendants owed addi-
tional installments in 1995 and 2000. The ad litem sought to have the
funds placed in section 142 trusts for the benefit of the minors. The trial
court agreed, but attempted to limit the trustee's ability to make distribu-
tions from the trusts beyond the statutory restrictions.21' The trial court
held a second hearing on the order authorizing the trusts, at which the ad
litem requested that the court follow the statutory language regarding
trust agreements. A trust officer at the institution that the judge named
as the trustee testified that his institution was not willing to accept the
trusts with the modifications specified by the trial judge. Counsel for the
institution testified that section 142 trusts must comply strictly with the
terms of the statute. The trial court denied the ad litem's motion for ap-
205. Id. at 519. The trust agreement provided that the trustee could conduct business
with "any person, firm, corporation or any trustee under any other trust." Id. The ac-
countant argued that this provision gave her permission to self-deal. The appeals court
held that the language was broad enough to support the trustee's reading, but that it was
not specific enough to show that the grantor intended to modify the duty of fidelity. Id.
The court held that the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that the grantor had full
knowledge of the accountant's self-dealing, and that the grantor specifically consented to
the accountant as serving both as trustee and accountant for the corporation. Id. In addi-
tion, the court held that evidence supported the grantor's implied consent to the partner-
ship's role in the purchase of the developer's interest. Id. at 520. The court thus held that
the grantor's actions following the execution of the trust instrument indicated that the
grantor intended that the broad language of the trust instrument modify the trustee's duty
of fidelity. Id. The court declined to construe the language of the trust agreement strictly
since the conduct of the parties evidenced the intention of the parties to modify the duty of
fidelity. Id.
206. 863 S.W.2d at 520.
207. Id at 522. The court found ample evidence of self-dealing, which the court held
was interrelated with the duty not to self-deal, but determined that the jury would have
reached a different verdict if the trial court had instructed them concerning the trust instru-
ment's modification of the trustee's duty of fidelity. Id. at 521-22.
208. 880 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
209. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 142.001-.007 (Vernon 1984).
210. 880 S.W.2d at 281.
211. The trial court wished to limit the trustee's ability to disburse trust funds for medi-
cal care only to those situations in which the minor's parents had no other means, including
insurance, to provide the medical care. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 142.005(b)(2) (Vernon
1984) provides that the trustee "may disburse amounts of the trust's principal, income, or
both as the trustee in his sole discretion determines to be reasonably necessary for the
health, education, support, or maintenance of the beneficiary." Id.
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proval of full statutory powers in the trusts and ordered that the trustee
may not make distributions in accordance with the statute until the mi-
nors reached age eighteen. The ad litem sought mandamus against the
trial court to compel it to modify the trusts to comply with the statute.
The appeals court held that the trial court's order violated the mandatory
terms of the statute and held that it had no discretion to do so.212 The
appeals court also held that mandamus was the only relief available to the
ad litem and minor beneficiaries. 213
212. 880 S.W.2d at 281.
213. Id.
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